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IN THE SUPRE1\1E COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GARY J. XANTHOS,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

)
)
)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

)
)

vs.

)

BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF
SALT LAKE CITY,

)
)
)

Case No. 18333

)

Defendant and
Appellant.

)
)

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court of the Third Judicial
District in favor of Respondent, ruling that the Respondent was not required to tear
down a dwelling which has been used as such for at least 40 years.

DISPOSITION - LOWER COURT
The District Court in this action, in accordance with the provisions of §10-9-15,
Utah Code Ann., (1953) as amended, determined that Salt Lake City and its Board of
Adjustment had inappropriately, unreasonably, arbitrarily and capriciously required the
Respondent to tear down a dwelling which had been in existence for 40 years or in the
alternative, to terminate using the building for residential purposes. The matter had
come before the Board of Adjustment to appeal a ruling of a City official who required
such action. The Board of Adjustment failed to relieve the Respondent from the City
official's order to tear down the building. A timely appeal of the Board of Adjustment's
denial was filed. In accordance with statute, Respondents filed a "plenary action." The
Court heard the evidence of the parties and granted the relief sought by the Respondent.
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In its brief, Appellant states that "The ruling legalized a structure, believed
originally to have been built as a garage and permitted its continued use as a single
family dwelling.n

(Appellant's Brief p. 1-2). It should be indicated that there was no

evidence that the dwelling was built as a garage (R.27 4). The evidence before the court
was that at least since as long ago as 1942, the building has been used as a residence. It
was further the testimony of the only witness who had personal knowledge of the use of
the building that in 1942 it was an old building and had never to her knowledge, been used
as a garage.

Further, Appellant incorrectly states that the court "assumed the

prerogative of independently reweighing and balancing interest." The court followed the
requirements of §10-9-15 and correctly heard, as is its duty, the ttplenary action for
relief" filed by the Respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent wishes that the ruling of the District Court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 18th day of April, 1974, the Respondent's deceased father, James
Xanthos, applied to Salt Lake City for a building permit to build four duplexes.
[(Plaintiff's Exhibit 21)]. At that time, the late Mr. Xanthos submitted an application
which is Appendix 1 to Appellant's Brief, as well as a plot plat, which is Appendix 2 to
Appellant's Brief and which is also attached to this Brief. Salt Lake City Corporation
approved said permit. The permit was issued on April 18, 1974. The late Mr. Xanthos
then commenced construction. Construction was completed in April, 1975. During the
period of construction, there were at least ten on-site inspections by the City (R. 220).
During the entire period of time of application and construction, the dwelling in question
was at the site and was available for inspection. There was testimony from one of the
building inspectors that the dwelling was noted but the inspectors determined not to
bother with it.
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Certificates of occupancy were issued on or about the 23rd day of April, 1975
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 13). Certificates of occupancy signify that all City requirements have
been met and the buildings were occupied.
The matter apparently came to the attention of the City because Nona Cottle, a
neighbor, was having difficulty with the tenant then residing at the dwelling. Mrs. Cottle
stated at the Board of Adjustment hearing that she did not object to the dwelling, but to
the tenant.
The trial dealt extensively with trying to determine when the home was built.
There was undisputed testimony from Mrs. Cottle that in 1942, the home was used as a
dwelling and that at that time it was not a new structure, but in fact, had an old and
weathered look (R.203). Further, there was testimony that through the years, the home
had continued to be used as a dwelling (R.203-204, 215). The Director of Planning and
Zoning stated (as reflected in the Board of Adjustment minutes) that the building was
there prior to 1927 when Salt Lake City's zoning ordinances were enacted.
The City officials testified that there were no known health or safety hazards
associated with the dwelling and that whether the structure was used as a residence or as
a garage or storage shed would not affect any health, safety, police or fire requirements
(R.325, 349 ).
There was testimony from City zoning officials that the entire parcel of land
contained sufficient square footage to meet the density requirements for the property
(R.329).

The City officials did state that the configuration of the buildings on the

property means that the house in question did not have required front, rear and side
yards, as required by the current zoning ordinances.
Contrary to the statement on page 3 of Appellant's Brief, pursuant to the Court's
questioning, City officials testified that there was no emergency access problem or
problems concerning light or open space (R.325,349).
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Contrary to the statements on page 3 of Respondent's Brief, there was no
admissible evidence that the home had once been a garage or that it had been illegally
converted from use as a garage. The only evidence is that as far as anyone knew, the
property had been used as a dwelling and was an older dwelling in 1942.
It should also be noted that appeal to the Board of Adjustment is the only method

of appeal provided by statute from any illegal, unreasonable or improper order of a City
building or zoning official.
It is the City's position that, although it did not notify the late James Xanthos of
any problem with his planned construction, and although three years had passed since the
duplexes had been built, and al though there were no com plaints about the building, and
although there are no concerns about the light, air, fire, police or access, the City has
the right to require a residence to be destroyed because of technical zoning
requirem entso
It is apparent that the City did not care about the existence of the structure at

the time of approving the plans or during the construction of the duplexes. In fact, the
City gave no explanation for its tardy interest in the property at all. The City was able
to give no reason other than the structure's non-compliance with present zoning and
requirements as to why the residence should be destroyed. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 11)
It would be comical, if not for the sadness of the inordinate expense caused the
Respondent by the City in this action, to note that the only substantive objection to the
dwelling is that the tenant is provided with a private garbage collection because he puts
his garbage in the bin used by the duplexes. A City official speculated that if there was
a more traditional front yard, then the tenant would be forced to take his garbage to
Ninth South to have City garbage collection. The City official then speculated that the
landlord would then save - maybe $5.00 - on garbage collection and would lower the
re·nt. This analysis provides the only substantive and practical reason for tearing down
the dwelling (R.394-395).
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The City never offered into evidence any transcript of the "hearing" at the Board
of

Adjustm~nt.

Nor to Respondent's knowledge was a transcript made or available;

rather, the only document introduced was Appendix 3 which contains the Board's ruling.
The statute provides that the Board of Adjustment will keep minutes.

There is no

reference to a requirement of keeping a record.
During the trial, City officials unsuccessfully attempted to justify their lack of
action prior to the time that the four duplexes were constructed. The Court ruled that
the actions of the City were unreasonable, capricious, contrary to law, contrary to good
sense and the building should be permitted to stay, as it had been there for a time which
probably exceeded the age of anyone participating in this case other than Mrs. Cottle.
The City's only attempt to justify its prior approval of the construction and plan is
based on the application of a Stan Conrad, whose identity was never determined. Mr.
Conrad - the City presumes - filled out the application putting a zero (0) answer to the
question "number of Wlits now on lot." The application also asked what the previous use
of the land was.

This was answered "vacant."

The plan which accompanied the

application clearly showed an nexisting building" in the upper left-hand corner.

The

obvious explanation is that the area on the property where the duplexes were to be built
was in fact vacant. In fact, there were no dwellings on the area where the four duplexes
were to be built.
application.

It should be emphasized that Mr. Xanthos did not complete the

He provided the plot plan.

Some sub-contractor filled out the form.

Respondent repeats that the plot plan which accompanied the application clearly shows
the existing buildings.

It should also be mentioned that the existing building was

available for anybody to see.
The Appellant incorrectly states on page 5 of its Brief that "The City approved
the duplex permit based on the assumption that the structure in controversy was not
going to be used as a dwelling."

There was no testimony to that effect whatsoever.

Appellant also incorrectly states that if the plan had been considered as one to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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accommodate nine units, it would have violated a number of City ordinances. If the City
had denied the application because of a violation of zoning ordinances, it would have
been possible for Mr. Xanthos to redesign the layout of the buildings to conform with
zoning ordinances, as pointed out by Mark Hafey, the City's Deputy Director of Zoning
(R.327-328).

Appellant's comments in paragraph 11 of its Brief (p.5) are interesting.

In

paragraph 5, Appellant admits that the building inspectors were aware of the premises
and discussed it.

The Brief recites that a new building inspector testified that he

informed his supervisor of the existence of the dwelling. The City set no condition or
requirement concerning tearing down the building, although it was well aware that it was
there.
The Appellant incorrectly states in paragraph 12 that there was a misleading
application. As the trial court correctly found, the actual plot plan shows the existing
building. The building was also there for anyone to look at. The explanation as to why
there was an inconsistency was obvious. On the location where the duplexes were going
to be built, there was no building. That land was vacant. There was in fact, no need, to
the Applicant's knowledge, to tear down or demolish any buildings in order to build the
new duplexes.
The Appellant engages in a discussion of the history of the site. In that discussion,
Appellant understandably tries to draw conclusions from Appellant's evidence which the
Court found to be unconvincing. With regard to paragraph 6, Appellant fails to state that
the City's records virtually did not exist. The lost records and plans, the errors made by
the City officials in looking for the records, the inaccuracies of the records and the
inconsistent devotion to enforcement are appalling. For example:

(1)

The City could not find the original permit (R.254).

(2)

The City could not find its authorization to provide power to the

6Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dwelling, yet the dwelling had had power for over 40 years (R.250).
(3)

The old records are often missing (R.246-247).

(4)

The City Engineer gave out numbers for an address which had been

used by Mrs. Cottle for years (R.318).
(5)

The City showed there was no water bill for the home. Respondent

nevertheless produced a qill he had gotten (R.319,324) (Exhibit 32).
(6)

The supervising building inspector had chronically failed to perform

his duties (R.240).
(7)

The County Assessor had been assessing a building on the site (Exhibit

P-16) although the City was unaware of it.
(8)

There was a sewer line which ,serviced the dwelling probably 40 years

although the City was unaware of it (R.294).
(9)

The City building personnel had not cared about enforcing the zoning

ordinances (although they were supposed to) at the time of the Xanthos application
(R.226).
(10)

Normally, when a building is over 40 or 50 years old, the City accepts

it as non-conforming because of trouble with its record-keeping system (R.234).
Because City officials did not find a building permit for the dwelling does not
mean that there was no dwelling. The Court made an express finding of fact that the
City's records were incomplete and therefore not reliable. The Court correctly found, as
the evidence showed, that in 1942 the building was being used as a dwelling and was used
thereafter as a dwelling.

Unfortunately, no witnesses were found who could give

personal testimony as to how the building was used before 1942. We do know that it was
an old building in 1942 and that it had always been used as a residence (R.203-204, 215).
Appellant further tries to argue that the structure had not received City
approval. There was no one to testify to that. The only evidence before the Court was
Mrs. Cottle's testimony and the incomplete and inaccurate City records.
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The City

attempted to prove that the structure was not used as a dwelling through the use of old
Polk directories.

Mrs. Cottle's detailed testimony of the history of the home and its

residents was obviously more convincing. The lack of reliability of the old directories
was apparent. The Polk directory constitutes hearsay evidence. We do not know who the
Polk personnel were who visited the site nor their degree of energy or devotion to their
job. We don't know whether they actually spoke to anybody or whether they even visited
the site. Naturally, a Court would believe the personal testimony of Mrs. Cottle, who
personally knew the people who lived in the house, versus the incomplete and inaccurate
City directories.

The reliability of the Polk directory was particularly questionable

because it used different addresses for the same property during different periods of
time.
The City officials testified that there is always a need for low cost housing and
there is a need for low cost housing in Salt Lake City, Utah (R.344,405). The trial court
further found that the City is in need of low cost housing and that this dwelling did in
fact supply low cost housing. The Court correctly found that requiring the destruction of
a building under these circumstances because of front yard requirements was
unreasonable,
Respondent.

capricious,

arbitrary and

constituted substantial hardship on the

The Court correctly found that requiring the destruction of a dwelling

under the circumstances in question was unreasonable, capricious, arbitrary and contrary
to law.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
THE RESPONDENT'S BUILDING SHOULD NOT BE
REQUIRED TO BE DEMOLISHED.
It is the Respondent's position that the District Court properly concluded that it

was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law for the City to require the

8
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demolition of the dwelling unit in question. The provisions of §10-9-15 provide that a
party aggrieved by a Board of Adjustment decision has the right to petition for a "plenary
action for relief."

The trial court correctly heard evidence pursuant to this "plenary

action."
The Respondent further contends, in the alternative, that even upon the Board of
Adjustment record, the trial court correctly found that the City's action in requiring the
demolition, and the Board of Adjustment's decision in not stopping that City action were
unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law. Although the Respondent
believes that the requirements of §10-9-15 mandate a new evidentiary hearing, even
under the standard of review advocated by the Appellant, there are sufficient facts to
show the unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious nature of the decision of the Board of
Adjustment. It is bewildering, however, to believe that the Legislature would state that
an aggrieved party has a "plenary action" for relief if what the Legislature meant was a
"limited right to review", as suggested by the Appellant.

A

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONDUCTED A
"PLENARY ACTION" PURSUANT TO UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED§ 10-9-15.
The statute at issue governing the appellate jurisdiction reads:
The City or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board
of adjustment may have and maintain a Qlenary action for
relief therefrom in any court of competent jurisdiction;
provided, petition for such relief is presented to a court of
competent jurisdiction within thirty days after the filing of
such decision in the office of the board. §10-9-15 Utah Code
Ann., (1953.} (Emphasis added)
The terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous.

Black's Law Dictionary

defines "plenary" as "full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified",

cit~ng

Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 191 Olka. 501, 134 P.2d 976 (1942). Collier's Dictionary
defines "plenary" as meaning "full, cqmplete, entire, absolute, unqualified." (Page 931.}
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Subs ti tuting the words complete, absolute and unqualified for "plenary" in the
statute would lead to a reading that a person aggrieved may have and maintain a full,
complete, absolute, unqualified action for relief. This is hardly the interpretation which
the defendant suggests. The defendant suggests that the action be limited to the review
of the Board of Adjustment record, that this review be limited to whether the Board of
Adjustment action was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious.

If the Legislature

intended for there to be a limited review of an administrative record, why was the phrase
"plenary action for relief" used'?
The Legislature in other statutes has used the phrase "an action" for "plenary
review".

This court in Pledger v. Cox, 626 P.2d 415 (1981), in interpreting its prior

decision in D. & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 98 Utah 438, 100 P .2d
455, said that since the word "review" was used the aggrieved party in that action was
entitled to a "trial upon the record made before the lower tribunal" without the
submission of new testimony. And the court further stated that because of the use of the
word "review" the court's review of the record would include fresh consideration of
questions of fact as well as questions of law. In Pledger v. Cox, the court noted that "de
novo" has two possible interpretations.

It can mean a complete retrial upon new

evidence or a trial upon the record before the lower tribunal. The court noted that what
trial de novo meant was dictated by the wording in the context of the statute, the nature
of the administrative body, and the procedure being reviewed.
In this case the only "record" which the Board of Adjustment produced was its
decision. To the Respondent's knowledge, there was no record made. There was no court
reporter present. The only "record" is the decision which is attached to Respondent's
Brief as Appendix 1 consisting of two typewritten pages.
statute requires the Board to keep minutes, not a record.

The Board of Adjustment
Although the Board of

Adjustment records on tape the proceedings of each board hearing, the taped recordings
are erased after 90 days.
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The Board of Adjustment is not structured to provide the type of record that
would be required should Appellant prevail. The Board is composed of volunteers who
meet twice monthly for a few hours. A copy of the Board of Adjustment morning agenda
is attached hereto as Appendix 2. The procedure before the Board is informal, is limited
in time, and its entire method of proceeding would have to be changed in order to provide
the formalities and a record which would make a limited review practical. This change in
procedure would be required not only in Salt Lake City but in every city and county in
the State of Utah.

It surely makes sense to permit the informal, inexpensive, fast

procedure which currently exists to remain in effect.

This allows the Board of

Adjustment to hear numerous cases in just a short period of time. In comparison, a full
record with full cross examination would have resulted in a trial of two full days. If the
only record is truly to be made before the Board of Adjustment, instead of hearing
numerous cases as it did the morning that the Xanthos matter came before it, the Board
of Adjustment would have to become a full time body, meeting every day of the week, all
day long.
The Court is well aware that administrative bodies which do make a record have
extensive hearings. The Legislature wisely determined to let the Board of Adjustment
remain small, efficient and fast. Only those parties particularly aggrieved will take their
case to court.
The City is requesting an interpretation of §10-9-15 which not only belies the
section's plain meaning but would put a financial burden on every city and county in the
State.

This would be an enormous expense on a regular basis to satisfy due process

requirements that a record sufficient to be reviewed be created.

Respondent

respectfully suggests that no such interpretation of the statute is required by this court.
In Denver and R. G. W. R. Co. v. Central Weber Sewer Improvement Dist., 4 Utah
2d 105, 287 P .2d 884 (1955), this court in reviewing a different statute analyzed review
requirements absent a specific statutory standard. The court concluded that in light of
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the fact that there was no record to review, there would be a denial of due process if the
reviewing court could not get at the facts. The court stated: 1'To hold otherwise, invites
rule by men, not laws. . . . n4 Utah 2d at 11 O. The court held that where, as here, there
is no record to review, nthe judiciary may awaken to question their warrant, and in doing
so, may receive, examine and weigh evidence, if necessary, as it did here on stipulated
facts, to the end that due process guarantees will maintain." 4 Utah 2d at 109.
The court concluded:
We believe the record made by the commission and certified to
the district court so lacking in information and fact as to have
justified the district court in receiving evidence to determine
whether the claimed property would or would not be benefited
directly by the improvement, and having done so and found
there would be no such benefit, there being substantial
evidence to justify such conclusion, we will not disturb the
judgment. If, under the particular circumstances of this case,
there could have been no inquiry into the facts other than
reflected in the commission's record, we are of the opinion the
respondents would not have been afforded the constitutional
guarantees of the due process clause. 4 Utah 2d at ll I.

The issue of the scope of judicial authority occurs in other areas of state
administrative law, with comparable statutes. In such statutes, the district court is
given the specific authority to hear evidence regarding the issue previously tried in an
administrative tribunal. The appeals provision of the Utah Operator's and Chauffeur's
License Act, for example, (Utah Code Ann.. §41-2-1

.!:.!

seq.) (1953) provides for a

statutory trial de novo. The appeal statute reads:
..• such court is hereby vested with jurisdiction and it shall be
its duty to set the matter for hearing on a ten days written
notice to the department and thereupon take testimony and
examine into the facts of the case and to determine whether
petitioner is entitled to a license. Utah Code Ann. §41-2-20
(1953).

This statute has been construed to confer appellate jurisdiction on the district
court from the decision of the Department of Public Saf etys Division of Drivers Licenses
and Accident Records. In McAverney v. State Department of Public Safety, 9 Utah 2d
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191, 341 P.2d 212 (1959), this court determined that the district court could not merely
review the department's action but must try the case de novo. In that case, a driver's
license was revoked by the Department of Public Safety and the holder of the license
appealed the revocation decision to the district court. The district court reviewed the
Department decision and affirmed.

The Supreme Court remanded, finding that the

statutory provisions provided for a trial de novo:
It appears that the lower court may have misconceived its
duties and responsibilities under the provisions of §41-2-20,
Utah Code Ann. 1953. Under the provisions of this statute, it
was the duty of the court to hear the case de novo, and not
merely as a review of the action of the Department • • . We
feel, and so hold, that the court was required to take
testimony, and examine into the facts, and make its own
independent determination as to whether the appellant was
habitually negligent driver, and whether his driver's license
should be suspended. 9 Utah 2d at 194.

In considering the same statute recently, this court rested validation of a
challenge to the de novo provisions of . the drivers license statute on general
administrative law. This Court, presented with the identical challenge to the de novo
provisions of that statute, considered the scope of appellate review over administrative
provisions and affirmed the statute providing for a de novo trial:
This interpretation of trial de novo affords the party who was
about to suffer from administrative action a closer judicial
scrutiny than a mere review of the record of agency action,
and we think this preferable in view of the seriousness of the
administrative action and the relative ease with which the
limited factual issue can be subjected to retrial in the district
court. Pledger v. Cox, 626 P.2d 415 (1981).
The aggrieved party in the instant action, Respondent before this Court, is in the
same situation. The seriousness of the impact of an adverse decision upon Respondent
was considered by the trial court and is well documented in its record. The limited
nature of the factual issue lent itself well to judicial resolution and was properly
considered by the lower court. The guidelines of Pledger v. Cox affirm the validity of
the district court's actions in the instant case. None of the "parade of horribles" posited
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by the Appellant in their Brief has resulted from the extension of plenary review over
administrative agencies in other areas.
Other jurisdictions provide for plenary, or full and complete, review of various
zoning decisions in district or other superior courts.

In such jurisdictions where the

statute has been at issue, appellate courts have determined that the appropriate standard
of review for the court is for the lower court to take additional testimony or weigh the
relevant facts.
One such instance is Glasgow v. Beaty, 476 P.2d 75 (Okla. 1970), a case where the
facts closely resemble those of the instant case.

In the Glasgow case, a municipal

administrative officer refused to grant an occupancy permit for a dwelling that was
determined to have insufficient off-street parking.

That denial was appealed to the

Board of Adjustment, which affirmed the decision of the administrator. The decision was
further appealed to the district court, which, after a trial de novo, reversed the Board of
Adjustment decision and granted the variance.
The appeal from the Board of Adjustment was taken pursuant to Okla. Stat. §44110 which reads:
(A) An appeal from any action, decision, ruling, judgment or
order of the Board of Adjustment may be taken by any person
or persons jointly or severally aggrieved • . . (D) The appeal
shall be heard and tried de novo in the district court. All
issues in any proceedings under this section shall have
preference over all civil actions and proceedings .•• (F) The
district court may reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or
modify the decision brought up for review ..•
The Supreme Court, correctly applying the terms of the statute, ruled:
Appeals from Board of Adjustments created pursuant to 11
O.S. 1961 §401 are to the district court and the cause is there
tried de novo. On a trial de novo, on applications for
variances, the burden of proof rests on applicant . • . . 476
P.2d at 78.
This statutory construction was recently affirmed by the Oklahoma Appeals Court
in the decision of Whitcomb v. City of Woodward. Considering another instance where a
14
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The granting or denial of a variance is within the sound
discretion of the municipal zoning officials and the Boards of
Adjustment. Melton vs. City of Durant, 521 P .2d 1372 (197 4).
Appeals from the decisions of the Board of Adjustments are to
the district court and the cause is tried de novo. These
proceedings are equitable in nature. Therefore, the scope of
review in this court is not to substitute its judgment for that of
the trial court, but rather to determine whether the trial court
has abused its discretion. Unless clearly against the weight of
the evidence, the judgment of the trial court will not be
disturbed. 616 P .2d 455 (Okla. App. 1980).
The Oklahoma statute closely resembles the Utah statute in that it outlines a
complete and detailed appellate procedure for the judiciary to follow where zoning
matters are at issue. It does not merely posit the remedy of "appeal" for those aggrieved
with the decision of the Board of Adjustment, but enlarges and defines the nature of the
remedy. Similarly, the Utah statute does not provide merely for "review" but provides
for an "action for plenary relief.''
Massachusetts is another state which provides for plenary proceeding at the
appellate level. The governing Massachusetts statute provides:
Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Board of Appeals
may within twenty one days after the decision is filed in the
office of the City or town clerk, bring a petition in the district
court within the judicial district where the land area to be
affected is situated •.• the court shall hear all evidence
pertinent to the authority of the board and determine the facts
and, upon the facts as so determined, annul such decision if
found to exceed the authority of such board, or make such
other decree as justice and equity may require. Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 40A, §21 (West 1977).
Construction of the statute has been similar to that of the Oklahoma statute, even
though the explicit provision for a de novo review was absent. As the Massachusetts
court explains, the statutory provisions encompass a full scale evidentiary hearing:
We are aware that there was some controversy at the time the
findings were made in the instant cases as to the duties of the
judge hearing such an appeal, but the statute has since been
fully and carefully considered••.• It is now plain that it is the
duty of the judge to determine the facts for himself upon the
evidence introduced before him and then apply the governing
principles of law and, having settled the facts and the law, to
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of the board and enter such decree as
may require in accordance with his
law and facts. Devine v. Zoning Board of
Mass. 319125 N.E.2d 131 (1955).

Other jurisdictions concur that the interpretation of their statutory appellate
review may be plenary in nature. Alabama 1, Florida 2, Arkansas 3, New Hampshire 4 are
among the states that provide for a de novo review of zoning adjustment decisions. Case
law from these jurisdictions, with statutes similar to that of Utah, provide a more
accurate indicia of the law than do cases from jurisdictions with substantially different
legislative mandates.
Appellant's reliance on the case of Williams v. Zoning Adjustment Board of the
City of Laramie, is misplaced. As explained above, in most zoning cases, the scope of
review is determined by statute. The Wyoming appellate procedure outlined by Wyoming
Code §15-626 only provided for an "appeal" which the Wyoming Court deemed ref erred to
a process by which judicial review was to be accomplished.

The Utah statute does

notmerely require an "appeal" it requires a "plenary action for relief."

Absent the

qualifying term "plenary," or any other clarifying term, the Wyoming court determined
"appeal" only encompassed the power to remove a cause from an administrative to a
judicial tribunal.

Respondent submits that to impose such an interpretation upon the

Utah statute would be to def eat the intent of the Legislature to provide for a
comprehensive judicial relief through the promulgation of §10-9-15. Further, Appellant's
contention that §10-9-15 should be linked in some manner to Rule 65(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure is unsupported by either reason or authority. The specific statutory
(1) Board of Zoning Adjustment of Hueytown vs. Warren, 366 So.2d 1121 (Ala. Civ. App.

1978)
(2) Union Trust Company vs. Lucas, 125 S.2d 582 (Fla. App. 1960)
(3) City of Little Rock v. Leewood Property Owners Ass'n., 272 Ark. 451,413 S.W.2d 877

(Ark. 1967)
'.4) Vogel vs. Board of Adjustment for City of Manchester, 92 N.H. 195, 27 A.2d 105 (N.H.

16
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contention that §10-9-15 should be linked in some manner to Rule 65(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure is unsupported by either reason or authority. The specific statutory
procedure is not intended to be diluted by the limited review provided by extraordinary
writs.
B

THE AffiENCE OF RECORD IN THE
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT PROCEEDINGS
MANDATES A PLENARY ACTION
The requirements for Board of Adjustment hearings are set forth in §10-9-8 of the
Utah Code Annotated.

The Board is not required to maintain a transcript of the

proceedings before it; instead, it need only:
. . • keep minutes of its proceedings, showing the vote of each
member· on each question, or if absent or failing to vote,
indicating such fact, and shall keep records of its examinations
and other official actions; all of which shall be immediately
filed in the office of the board and shall be a public record.
§10-9-8, Utah Code Ann. (1953).
Again, Appellant relies on case law that is inapposi te to the instant case. The
case of Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah
1976) did not involve either a zoning issue or a board of adjustment proceeding. Rather,
the dispute arose out of the County Commission's revocation of Respondent's
massage/health studio license.

Respondent's appeal thus reached the district court

through the County Commission, under an administrative appeal procedure that bears no
resemblance to that provided by §10-9-15. It is significant to note, however, that in
Peatross, this Court affirmed the responsibility of the district court to exercise its
appellate review power to maintain supervisory control over inferior tribunals.
Peatross also establishes a standard by which the grant of plenary review to
district court may be evaluated. This Court articulated that standard:
The standard rule is that appellate jurisdiction is the authority
to review the actions or judgments of an inferior tribunal upon
the record made in that tribunal, and to affirm, modify, or
reverse such action or judgment. 555 P.2d at 284.
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Absent such a record, however, the district court is required to conduct a plenary
review, re-evaluating the evidence to come to its own decision.

This action was

recognized and explained in the case of Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. vs. Central Weber
Sewer Improvement District, 4 Utah 2d ll O, 287 P.2d 884 (1955). In that case, the Weber
County Commission conducted a hearing to determine the creation of a water and sewer
taxation district.

Respondent utilities owned real and personal property within the

district which they felt should be excluded from the tax base since it would not be
benefited directly by the sewer services. Respondents appealed the County Commission's
decision to tax the property to the district court. On review, the district court accepted
evidence and heard witnesses.

Appellants to the Supreme Court, the Commission,

claimed error, contending that district court review was limited to an examination of the
record made by the County Commission.
This Court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that absent a statute to
the contrary where there was an adequate record, that record alone is the proper basis
for review. However, the court continued:
But where, as here, there is nothing to review but an ipse dixi.t,
due process would be denied if the reviewing court could'IlOt
get at the facts. To hold otherwise would invite a rule of law
by men, not laws, and would lead to such absurd results . . . 4
Utah 2d at 11 O.
The necessity of a comprehensive record of the proceedings before a Board of
Adjustment for adequate appellate review on the record was explained by the North
Dakota Supreme Court in the case of Shaw v. Burleigh County, 286 N. W.2d 792 (N .D.
1979).

The North Dakota high court interpreted the North Dakota statute which

provides:
All a~p~als taken from decisions of a Board of County
Comm1ss1oners shall be docketed as other cases pending in the
district court and shall be heard and determined de novo. N.D.
Cent. Code §11-11-43.
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In holding that such an appeal required plenary review in the district court, the
court determined:
From an evolutionary standpoint, we have allowed the district
court to hear testimony, receive exhibits, and make a decision
as it would in any trial, without regard to the findings and
decisions of the Board of County Commissioners. Berger v.
County Commission, 275 N.W.2d 315 (N.D. 1979).
The
practical reason for allowing the district court to proceed in
this manner is that there is no complete record of the
proceedings. before the board. The proceedings at the county
agency level are not transcribed.
286 N.W.2d at 796.
(Emphasis added)
Absent a complete certified record which the district court could utilize for
review purposes, the district court must conduct a retrial on the issues, considering in
many cases substantially the same evidence as was before the Board of Adjustment.
Appellant's contention that the confirmation of this power in the district court
will transform it into a super board of adjustment is conclusory and unfounded. Such a
contention ignores the successful use of this procedure in numerous other states (supra)
and within other review provisions in Utah administrative statutes.

c
THE LOWER COURT EXERCISED PROPER APPELLATE
JURISDICTION OVER THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
BASED ON THE RECORD BEFORE THE BOARD.
In the alternative, acceptance of the standard of review forwarded by Appellant
also supports the decision of the trial court. In finding that the action of the Board of
Adjustment was arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law, the trial court evaluated
essentially the same evidence as the Board of Adjustment. The sketchy facts outlined in
the minutes provide compelling reasons for the grant of the variance to Mr. Xanthos.
Testimony before the Board demonstrated more than ample evidence to support a
grant of the variance on the grounds of unnecessary hardship and special circumstances.
The Board of Adjustment was informed that the building had been built prior to 1927 and
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had been a dwelling for a substantial period of time. The Board also found, "In looking at
the plans, it was assumed that the building was an accessory building; but the building
inspector should have noted the problem when inspecting the property." (Findings and
Order; case number 7928; Plaintiff's Exhibit 12). The Board determined further, "It was
noted that the certificates of occupancy were issued for the duplexes ••• these problems
should have been caught when the ~uplexes were inspected." (Id, at 2). The facts alone,
as the trial court correctly indicated in Finding of Fact 21, constitute special
circumstances sufficient to grant a variance.
Evidence of unnecessary hardship was also considered by the Board and was
properly before the trial court on appeal. A neighbor indicated she was not disturbed by
the house per se, but only the occupying tenants. Mr. Xanthos indicated that the problem
could be remedied. There was no evidence presented to the Board indicating reasons the
property should be brought into compliance.

Concerns about fire access, garbage

collection, and other health and safety concerns were not raised before the Board, and
under the City's standard, could not have been presented before the trial court.
Hardship to the owner was presented to the Board of Adjustment. The minutes of
the meeting recorded that, ". • • the dwelling provides low income housing and is
necessary for the economic feasibility of the duplex project." (Id). No contrary evidence
was presented to the Board of Adjustment, and the Board never addressed the hardship
imposed by the City on Mr. Xanthos by the destruction of the dwelling.
Appellant contends incorrectly that the trial court established itself as the City
Board of Adjustment. Respondent did not substantially deviate in its contentions before
the trial court that the City was estopped from enforcement of the zoning ordinances
through the actions of numerous City officials; that the City's failure to note a zoning
violation for a substantial period after the construction bars any enforcement of zoning
laws; and that special circumstances and conditions of unnecessary hardship justify the
authorization of a variance for nonconforming use. After an exhaustive inquiry into the
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evidence supporting these contentions, the trial court adjudged the request for a variance
to be proper.
The trial court should not serve as a rubber-stamp authority for the Board of
Adjustment. In the instant case, the trial court properly conducted a plenary action for
relief from the Board of Adjustment's decision. In doing so, the court considered the
same substantive issues that were before the Board and determined the Board's decision
to be arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.

D

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR
IN FAILING TO GIVE PRESUMPTIVE WEIGHT
TO THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT'S DECISION

Appellant contends that zoning decisions are universally given presumption for
purposes of judicial review. As should already be clear, the degree of weight given to
administrative zoning decisions varies from state to state and is governed by statute.
Additional considerations for purposes of judicial review are the nature of the
administrative zoning decision and the basis upon which that decision rests.
Cases cited by Appellant in support of its position are distinguishable. As noted
supra, the Williams case was governed by a different type of statute, resulting in the
application of substantially different principles of law. The Williams court itself notes
that the review of exceptions and variances to zoning statutes is governed by its own
state statute.
Equally distinguishable are cases involving re-zoning decisions.

Zoning changes

are legislative action in which ordinances are amended. The cases do not involve an
interpretation of §10-9-15.

Furthermore, as court review of legislative action, the

standard of review is significantly different. An example is a case cited by Appellant,
Cottonwood Heights Citizens Ass'n v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 493
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P.2d 138, (Utah 1979). That case involved the rezoning of an area for a multi-family
dwelling and not the issuance of a variance for an already extant nonconforming use.
Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 17 Utah 2d 306, 410 P .2d 764, (1966), also relied
upon by Appellant, considered an even more extensive zoning change to permit an
expansion of commercial development into a residential neighborhood.
Reference to other state practices reveals a lack of uniformity in the weight
given to the Board of Adjustment decision in a variance case. In Massachusetts, under
the statute described supra, at p. 15:
The decision of the Board is no more than the report of an
administrative body and on appeal has no evidentiary weight.
In the superior court, the appeal is heard de novo. The decision
of the board cannot be treated as a report of an auditor, a
master, a commissioner, an assessor, or some other judicial
officer in the usual course of judicial proceedings. Devine v.
Zoning Board of Appeals of Lynn, 332 Mass. 319, 125 N .E.2d
131 (Mass. 1955).
Alabama addresses the same rule under their statute granting plenary review to
the circuit court:
Any party aggrieved by any final judgment or decision of such
Board of Zoning Adjustment may within fifteen days thereafter
appeal therefrom to the circuit court by filing with such Board
a written notice of appeal specifying the judgment or decision
from which the appeal is taken. In case of such appeal, such
Board shall cause a transcript of the proceedings in the action
to be certified to the court to which the appeal is taken, and
action in such court shall be tried de novo. Alabama Code §1152-81 (1977).

The purpose of the certified transcript was explained by an Alabama appellate
court in 1978:
In view of the type of proceedings to be had in the circuit
court, lf!e are unable to perceive the efficacy of certifying the
transcript of the Hue own Board of Zonin Ad·ustment
Proceedings to the c1rcw t court ot er t an to perm1 a better
understanding of the issues before the circuit court. . . .
Furthermore, we are convinced that the transcript would have
no evidentiary value in view of the de novo type hearing to be
conducted in the circuit court. Board of Zoning Adjustment of
Hueytown v. Warren, 366 So.2d 11_21 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978).
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POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED ABSENT
A FINDING IT ACTED IN AN
ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS MANNER

The Peatross case, supra, outlined the proper scope of review available to this
court in considering the appropriateness of the action of the district court. Only upon a
showing that an action was as "capricious and arbitrary", will the decision of the lower
court be disturbed. There was no such demonstration of either of these factors in the
instant case, nor does the Appellant contend any such abuse occurred. When an issue has
been committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, that discretion will not be
infringed upon unless it is shown that the discretion exercised therein has been abused.
Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, (Utah 1976).
Under §10-9-15, that discretion is clearly placed in the power of the trial court.
A Pennsylvania court, in considering a zoning appeal from the lower court, articulated
the standard applicable in the discrete area of zoning:
Where additional evidence is taken and the court decides the
matter de novo, our review is limited to a determination of
whether the Court committed an error of law or an abuse of
discretion. Overstreet v. Zonin Hearin Board of Schu kell,
49 Pa. Cmwlth. 404, 412A.2d169 Pa. Cmwlth 1980.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court concurred in this view, indicating: ". . . the
judgment of the district court will not be reversed unless clearly against the weight of
the evidence." Board of Adjustment of Oklahoma City v. Shaunbour, 435 P.2d 569 (Okla.
1968).

This Court has recognized that in matters of equity before it, such as the instant
case, deference will be given to the position of the trial judge who sees and hears
witnesses and considers all the evidence before the trial court.
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While it is the responsibli ty of this court to review the
evidence in equity cases, it will not disturb the findings of fact
made below unless they appear to be clearly erroneous and
against the weig'ht of the evidence. In conduc~ing our review
of the evidence, we are, of course, mmdful of the
advantageous position of the trial judge who sees and hears t.he
witnesses, and we are constrained to give due. deference to its
decisions by reason thereof. McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996
(Utah 1978).

The two volumes of records and numerous exhibits attached indicate that the
district court carefully considered all of the facts in the instant case. The lower court
properly considered the public interest em bodied in the zoning plan and the special
circumstances attached to the property of the Respondent.

It heard testimony from

numerous witnesses over the period of the two day trial, and the Appellant was given
ample opportunity to prosecute its case before the court.
POINT III
EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS, LACHES AND ESTOPPEL
WERE PROPERLY CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT

An ingredient which cannot be ignored in this case is the basic unfairness and
waste which a ruling in the City's favor would create. At the time that the late James
Xanthos applied for and received a building permit, during the entire period of
construction and inspection, through the period of inspections which led to the issuance
of a certificate of occupancy, and for approximately three years thereafter, Salt Lake
City did not object to the design of his project. As Mark Hafey, the Deputy Director of
Zoning stated, it would have been possible to design the addition of four duplexes on this
parcel of land without necessitating the destruction of the dwelling unit in question.
In an analogous situation, this court in discussing the issue of estoppel in zoning
cases, stated:
In our view, the tests employed by most other jurisdictions
tend to subject land owners to undue and even calamitous
exp~nse. because of. changing City councils or zoning boards or
their dilatory action and to the unpredictable results of
burdensome litigation.
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The economic waste that occurs when a project is halted after
substantial costs have been incurred in its commencement is of
no benefit either to the public or to land owners. In a day
when housing costs have severely escalated beyond the means
of many prospective buyers, governmental action should not be
based on policies that exacerbate a severe economic problem
without compelling justification. Governmental power should
be exercised in a manner that is reasonable and, to the extent
possible, predictable. Western Land Equities Inc. v. City of
Logan, 61 7 P. 2d at 395.

The court went on to indicate that where problems arise which seriously threaten
public heal th, safety or welfare, the interests of the public should nonetheless be
protected.

The court indicated that a property owner should be able to develop his

property with a degree of assurance that the basic rules will not be changed in
midstream.
The Xanthos family has been victimized by lost City records, ahanging personnel,
lack of diligence, negligence and a belated change in policy and attitude resulting from
changing personnel in the Salt Lake City Building Department. The loss to the Xanthos
family is clear. An income producing dwelling will be destroyed. The loss to Salt Lake
City is clear. Low cost rental housing will be needlessly destroyed. The City officials
have testified that there are no safety, health, welfare, fire or access problems. The
only governmental concern mentioned was the proximity of the garbage container to the
dwelling's tenant and whether the cost, if any, had been added to the tenant's rent. It is
perhaps an understatement to say that this governmental concern should be considered
minor rather than serious.
The position of this court with regard to zoning estoppel rests on a substantial
foundation of prior case law, both in this jurisdiction and in other states.
The instant case is a clear example of good faith reliance. James Xanthos, father
of the deceased, submitted all of the requisite forms which complied with the City's
requirement for building approval. As the trial court found in Finding of Fact number 15:
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The plot submitted as part of the original building application
for four duplexes by the plaintiff's deceased father, James
Xanthos, showed that there was an existing building on the
site . . . . 19. Although the application made no reference to
the single family dwellings, the inclusion of the building on the
olot olan was sufficient disclosure by the applicant to place the
City" on reasonable notice to make further inquiry about the
existence and use of the building.

The District Court's findings clearly indicate that the regular application
procedures were pursued and were substantially complied with.

(See Exhibit P-1)

Consequently, the approval of the building permits gave grounds for Mr. Xanthos to
pursue his development.
Furthermore, the configuration of the four duplexes on the lot evidences good
faith reliance on the part of Mr. Xanthos. Again, the trial court's findings indicate "The
gross square footage of the property would accommodate, based upon minimum area
requirements, four duplexes in a single family dwelling if properly designed." (Finding of
Fact number 9)

It is important to stress that throughout the application period, the

construction of the duplexes, and for a substantial period of time following the
completion of the duplexes, there was no intimation by the City that the permit had been
erroneously issued. Mr. Xanthos had no way of finding out potential problems, and there
can be no dispute that he proceeded in good faith upon the representations made by the
City that he was in compliance with their requirements.
Similarly, there are numerous acts by the City which induced Mr. Xanthos'
reliance.

Beginning with the approval of the initial application until the

Board of

Adjustment hearing, there is an unbroken series of acts by the City which permitted and
encouraged the construction of the duplexes. Again, the trial court finding supports the
fact that there was actual inducement on the part of the government which caused Mr.
Xanthos to act. For example, Finding of Fact number 19 indicates that the placement of
the dwellings on the plat was sufficient notice to the City. The City's failure to make
any further inquiry is a manifest omission upon which Respondent was entitled to rely.
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Mark Haf ey testified similarly that even had there been a problem with square
footage, it might have been possible to obtain a variance for a dwelling behind the
duplexes. Such variances are common throughout the City (R. 328). This point alone has
been the basis for a finding of estoppel in similar cases involving lot setbacks and
minimum lot sizes. See Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976), and
Wood v. North Salt Lake, 15 Utah 2d 245, 390 P.2d 858 (1964). Furthermore, as Mr.
Blair, the Director of the Building Department testifed, the City normally does not
enforce rules against buildings 40 to 50 years old.
Moreover, there is the failure of the numerous City building inspectors, who
repeatedly visited the site, to make any protest with regard to the dwelling. As the trial
court noted in Finding number 17:
City building inspectors went to the site at least five times
during the course of construction.
The structure was
observable to the inspectors, and one of the City inspectors,
Marvin Peguillan, observed the building and inquired about it,
but none of the inspectors followed through with removing the
building from use or availability for use as a dwelling.

At trial, the head of the City building department testified that for a project of
this type, there must have been at least 10 inspections from four different people in
order to receive final approval (R. 220). Not one of these people objected or otherwise
brought to Mr. Xanthos' attention the nonconforming placement of the duplexes. If the
nonconforming use is obvious and offensive to public safety and health as is claimed by
Appellant, the failure of City representatives to note the dwelling becomes confounding.
The City went further and issued certificates of occupancy for the completed
structures (Exhibit P-13), another clear affirmative act upon which Mr. Xanthos could
rely. The Finding of Fact by the trial court indicates,
18. The City issued certificates of occupancy for the four
duplexes.
There was no evidence or record of any
communication of conditions or stipulations restricting or
concerning the use or removal of the structure as a single
family dwelling.
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Through the certificates of occupancy, the City certified i_ts final and absolute
approval to a development which it encouraged through all stages of planning and
construction.

Finally, the length of time the structures were allowed to stand

unchallenged constitutes an affirmative act or omission as contemplated by this court in
Western Equities upon which Mr. Xanthos was entitled to rely.
In evaluating the potential loss to owner, the court determined 1'The proposed
solutions of removal or change in use would eliminate a dwelling which is clearly
habitable and which has and is being put to valuable use." Finding of Fact. The court
continued:
11. Elimination of the unit also creates an economic hardship
for the plaintiff in this action by imposing an unnecessary loss
of $150.00 per month.

As was indicated in the record, the economic standing of Xanthos is such that the
$150.00 rental income from the dwelling is necessary for him t<?-. break even on the
development (R. 147)$ Thus, the loss of the dwelling as a rental unit would have serious
financial impact on the Respondent.
Contrasted against the financial hardship of the Respondent is the minimal or
nonexistent interest of the City in having the structure removed. The court makes the
balance in Finding 13 by noting "Continuation of the use as a dwelling in this case will
not substantially affect the comprehensive plan of Salt Lake City.

Whereas strict

enforcement will cause unnecessary hardship for tenant and owner, without furthering
the general plan." The court underlined the weakness of the City's position by correctly
finding:
The solutions of modifying the building to some accessory or
auxiliary use or demolition would result in no improvements or
enhancement of safety requirements, traffic circulation, air
space, or the health, safety or morals of the community.
Finding of Fact number 8.
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Indeed, in the instant case, public policies regarding the provision of low-income
housing would be retarded by the removal of the dwelling from the housing pool. (Finding
number 10)

(R-44, R-405).

Clearly, placing the case at bar into a balancing test to

determine substantial reliance results in a finding for Respondent.
In summary, the trial court found correctly for Mr. Xanthos when it determined ·as
a matter of fact that "The imposition of the strict enforcement of the zoning ordinance
upon the petitioner is unnecessary in order to carry out the general purpose of the zoning
plans and the comprehensive plan in the City." [emphasis added]
The question must be asked, when is a citizen safe from a change in City
personnel, different interpretations of ordinances, or changing policies? Should not a
citizen be entitled to rely on a building permit? Should not a citizen be permitted to rely
on a Certificate of Occupancy·? If these municipal actions cannot be relied on, why are
they issued?

rv
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
A VARIANCE WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. §10-9-12(3)
§10-9-12(3), Utah Code Ann. (1953), together with judicial interpretations of that
section, support the trial court's position in granting a variance. Appellant's argument
misstates the case law of zoning variances in Utah, because that argument omits a major
factor in the granting of zoning ordinances. The general rule for the granting of zoning
. variances in Utah was set forth in Walton vs. Tracy Loan and Trust Company:
In other words, if in a specific case the enforcement of a
regulation according to its strict letter would cause
unnecessary hardship and the Board can, by varying or
modifying the application of the regulation obviate the
hardship and at the same time fully effectuate the spirit and
purpose of the ordinance, they are authorized to do so. 92 P .2d
724, 728 (Utah 1939)
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The statute authorizing the Board of Adjustment to grant variances outlines several
criteria, all of which were addressed by the trial court, by which the grant of a variance
should be evaluated.
The first criteria set forth by the statute is unnecessary hardship. In finding that
this element existed in the instant case, the trial court found that:
8. The solutions of modifying the building to some accessory
or auxiliary use or demolition would result in no improvements
or enhancement of safety requirements, traffic circulation, air
space, or the health, safety or morals of the community.

Thus, no public interest whatsoever is served by the denial of the variance to Mr.
Xanthos. Further, the gratuitous destruction of. the dwelling would impose a loss to both
the community and to Mr. Xanthos. The loss of a dwelling unit would exacerbate an
acknowledged shortage of low income housing in the City and would impose a severe
hardship on Mr. Xanthos. Consideration of these two factors amply justifies the variance
authorization. The trial court determined:
11. Elimination of this unit would cause a hardship to a tenant
who would be deprived of a habitable dwelling at a relatively
low cost of $150. 00 per month.
12. Elimination of the unit also creates an economic hardship
for the plaintiff in this action by imposing an unnecessary loss
of $150.00 per month.

Appellant contends that financial considerations are never to be taken into
account in determining the issue of practical difficulties and unnecessary hardship. This
contention is both absurd and not supported by Utah case law or decisions from other
jurisdictions. Ultimately, all hardship can be reduced to economic terms. To ignore the
economic consequences of a zoning decision would be to ignore the very foundation upon
which modern zoning law rests regulation.

the maximization of land use through municipal

Appellant's own case of Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851
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(1959), reh. den. 282 N.Y. 681, 226 N.E.2d 811, utilizes the phrase "reasonable return", a.
concept that is measured economically.

Furthermore, Appellant fails to forward any

alternative measure by which unnecessary hardship could be evaluated.
The general rule recognizes the validity of the integrating financial considerations
and zoning decisions and is stated in 58 Am.Jur. "Zoning", p. 1053, §207:
In determining whether to grant a variation of the application
of the zoning restriction to a particular piece of property, it is
proper to take into consideration the availability or suitability
of the property for conforming use, and the imposition by such
use of financial lo$ on the owner of the property by
depreciation in value or income. Indeed, there are several
decisions to the effect that a case of unnecessary hardship may
be established by showing that the premises in question cannot
be made to yield a reasonable return if used only for a
conforming use, or that the premises are not adapted to a
profitable conforming use.

Prominent zoning authorities agree:
A zoning board of appeals may grant a variance upon the
ground of "unreasonable hardship" if the land cannot yield a
reasonable return if only used for a purpose allowed in that
zone and the plight of the owner is due to unique
circumstances and not to general conditions in the
neighborhood which may reflect the unreasonableness of the
zoning ordinance itself and the use to be authorized will not
alter the essential character of the locality. Yokeley, Zoning
Law and Practice, 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, §138, p. 336.

Utah law has recognized the importance of considering financial factors in the
decision of whether or not to grant a variance. In Gibbons and Reed Company v. Salt
Lake City, 19 Utah 2d, 431 P .2d 559 (1967), this court was presented with the problem of
granting a variance to the operators of a gravel excavation site. The City sought to
enforce certain zoning ordinances which would have prohibited the use of the piece of
property for a gravel quarry. The court, in affirming the trial court's decision to allow
the use of the contested land to continue, indicated:
Thus, after considering all the factors involved, including the
existing use of the property, the availability of a natural
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resource the severe loss to both the fee owners and the public
as comp~red to the relatively small inconvenience to owners in
that neighborhood, we conclude that there is evidence in the
record to support the trial court's decision that the zoning
ordinance enforced against the plaintiff's property is an invalid
exercise of the police power. 19 Utah 2d 329, 335.

The court took specific notice of the economic consequences of the zoning
ordinances on the gravel pit owners. It contrasted this economic hardship against the
consequences to the general public and found that the zoning ordinance worked an
nunnecessary hardshipn on the property owners.
The lower court was not of the op1mon that the gravel
operations would have any substantial adverse effect upon the
value of other property in North Salt Lake. In fact, there was
testimony at the trial that because of the influence of
industrial activity in other gravel pi ts surrounding the
subdivision on the south and east, and the highway, commercial
areas, and industrial activities on the north and west, the
excavation on parcel D would not adversely affect the value of
the subdivision.
Conversely, if such an ordinance were
allowed, the record indicates that the fair market value of
plaintiff's property would be reduced from $86,000.00 to
approximately $39,000.00. In addition to that, the plaintiff
would be unable to utilize sand and gravel deposits of a value
approximately one million dollars. 19 Utah 2d at 334.

This court should follow the better reasoned rule of the consideration of financial
consequences in evaluating the unnecessary hardship to the Respondent when deciding
this case.
Appellant also contends that the grant of a variance to Mr. Xanthos confers upon
him a special privilege. Respondent fails to see, and Appellant to explain, the nature of
this "special privilege." Respondent seeks no special privilege; it only seeks to retain the
present configuration of the property, a configuration assented to and approved by
numerous City officials.
Similarly, Appellant's contention that the Respondent seeks a more profitable use
of the property is unsupported by the record. As the property owner noted, he is "barely
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breaking even" on the property as it is currently being used (R.147). The record and facts
clearly demonstrate that the Respondent will suffer the loss of enjoyment of a
nsubstantial property right" through the demolition or conversion of the existing dwelling.
Finally, Appellant fails to muster any convincing support for its contention that
the grant of this particular variance will result in a flood of variance applications and the
collapse of the zoning plan of Salt Lake City (Brief of Appellant, p. 45).

Such an

overstatement ignores the unique characteristics of the instant case recognized by the
trial court:
21. There are special circumstances attached to the property
covered by the application which do not generally apply t-0
other properties in the same district including, but not limited
to: (a) the age and occupancy of the dwelling; (b) the approval
by the City of the development of the duplexes and the
issuance of certificates of occupancy for the duplexes; and (c)
the failure of the City to inform James Xanthos that the
dwelling would not comply with zoning ordinances thereby
failing to give him the opportunity to redesign the layout for
the duplexes in such as way as not to require the demolition of
the dwelling.

These special circumstances, and the increased vigilance of the City over its own
zoning authorization procedures, should suffice to ensure the continued viability of a
comprehensive m Wlicipal zoning plan.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court found correctly that the decision of the Board of Adjustment was
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Utah statute grants a Respondent in such
action a plenary appeal, a remedy which was pursued in this case. Given the unique
circumstances of this case, the unnecessary financial loss imposed upon the property
owner, and the fact that the City approved the project several times, the beneficial
effect of the low income housing, the absence of any adverse effect on the community,
the trial court correctly found the dwelling should not be demolished. The record clearly
supports the decision of the court.

34
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Brief of Respondent was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the

--- day of October,

1982, to the following:
Roger F. Cutler
Salt Lake County Attorney
Judy Lever
Assistant City Attorney
100 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
F~INGS

A...'fD ORDER, CASE NO. 7928

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION:
This is an appeal by Gary J. Xanthos for a variance to legalize a single-family
dwelling at 1610 West 900 South Street on a lot with a newly constructed duplex
which causes the dwelling to not have frontage on a dedicated street, without the
required side and rear yards, and without the required off-street parking in a Residential "R-2'' District.
Cary Xanthos was present together with Richard Rappaport of 66 Exchange Place. Also
present was Nona T. Cottle of 1616 West 900 South. Mr. Jorgensen explained that the
single-family dwelling located on the rear portion of the lot was evidently built
some time prior to 1927 and may have been a garage originally situated right on the
alley. If it was built prior to 1927 it was built before there was any zoning. In
1974 a permit was taken out for four duplexes plus carports. The plans indicated an
existing building on the lot but it was not marked as a dwelling. In looking at the
plans, it was assumed that the building was an accessory building; but the building
inspectors should have noted the problem when inspecting the property. It would be
permiasable to have an accessory building behind the duplexes but not a dwelling.
If it would have been known that it was a dwelling the duplexes would never have
been permitted to be constructad in front of it. Every building has to face on a
dedicated street. Even if a building is situated way in the back of the lot with
room for another dwelling, one could not be constructed in front of it because it
would make either the building in the front illegal or the building in the rear illegal. L&ura Landikusic presented the original plans and penait• whic..i.i indicate no
dwelling on the lot at that time. The applicant who filed for the pennit stated
that the property was vacant. It was also noted that the carports were not constructed in accordance with the plans the building permit was issued on. The carports were to he detached directly off the alley but they are attached with the
rear area blacktopped instead of landscaped. Mr. Rappaport explained that James
Xanthos was the owner of the property at the time of construction but is now deceased. Mr. Rappaport stated that he understood that the building was a dwelling
at the time the duplexes were constructed. He forther stated that the dwelling provides lov-income housing and is necessary for the economic feasibility of the duplex
project. Ha further stated that he doesn't knov of any complaints. Mr. Rappaport
explained that if the deceased had knovn of the violation at the time he applied for
the -?ermit he could have arranged a different plan but ,the property was Jnspected by
varioua inspectors and nothing waa said. Mr. Rappaport feels that at the time of
construction there was no intention of violating the law; a proper ?arm.it was obtained.
Nona Cottle who owns the adjacent property stated that as far as she knows the house
was occupied when the duplexes were constructed but Mr. Xanthoa~did put in some new
wiring and put new siding on the house although he told her he wasn't supposed to.
She explained that the house has no foundation under it and was built from the inside out. She is not in opposition so much to the house being there but to the pre9ent occupants. They bring in a lot of traffic and noise. The blacktopping of the
alley leading to the house was also discussed. It was brought out that there are
many older homes in the City that don't have foundations but the house should be inspected for other violations. Mr. Xanthoa stated that the tenant in the house could
be changed if that would make it more acceptable to Ms. Cottle. It was also noted
by the Board that there are soma junk cars by the house that should be removed. Mr.
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Case No. 7928

Page 2Xanthos waa informed that he is responsible for the tenants and so he i• responsible
for getting the cars removed. Later in the meeting the various aspects of the caae
were reviewed. It was noted that certificates of occupancy were issued for the duplexes. The single-family dwelling haa no rear yard and insufficient side yards.
There is no record of a modified plan being filed for the alterations from the original ?lans for the duplexes. These problems should have been caught when the duplexes were inspected. The violation was brought to the attention of Building and
Housing from another department in the City. The small house has to be either removed or legalized. Al Blair explained that the building inspector ~ually doesn't
look at the permit, he refers to the plot plan. The Board felt that some of the
blacktop in the rear yard should be removed and landscaping installed. It was noted
that the carports are legal although they are not built in the configuration indicated
on the original plans.
From the evidence before it and after further consideration, it is the opinion of
the Board that the granting of the requested variance would be inimical to the best
interest of the district and contrary to the spirit and intent of the Zoning Ordinance since the Board could find no unusual condition attached to thia property which
would deprive the owner of a substantial property right or use of his property, since
the building permit indicated that there were no dwellings on the property and since
no evidence vaa presented which would justify the requested variance.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the requested variance be denied and the violations
corrected wi&::hin 30 days •
Action taken by the Soard of Adjustment at its meeting held Monday, February 26, 1979.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah. this 12th day of March, 1979.

Vice Chairman
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Garv J. Xanthos tor a variance ; for a si:ieclal exceotlon to the
to leoJallze a slngle-famflv dwel·
ordinance to permit the two11"9 on a lot with a newly
level ?arking structure at 2027
constructed duplex which
Oou91as Street which requires
causes the dwellifl9 to not have
Board of Adlustment approval
NOTICE
N 0 T I C E I S HE RE BY
GIVEN ltlat !tie Board of Adiustment on Z!111il19 of Salt Lake
Cltv, Utah, will at its meeting to
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rear vards, and without the
required off-street parking in a
Residential "R-1" District•... J
Case No. 79'1.9 at 82' East
South. Temp11e Street and 823
Hanover Place in application of
White Rock Mot. Comoany tor a
>oeclat exception to ttie ordl·
.iance to oermit a parking lot In
a Residential "R-6" Oistrlct which requires Board of Adiustment approval.
. __
Case No. 7930 at 520 North 800
West Street in application of
Paul M. Savage for a oermit to
construct a detached ;araae
and storage area which would
excaed the Permitted 720
SQuare feet of area allowed tor
auxillarv buildings in a Resi·
dential."R-2" District.
Case No. 7931 at ffie sou~·west corner of Cheyenne and
300 South St1"4tts in application

previous meeting. at 1"60 Ambassador Way in application of
Arun V. SidWal to leQallze a
grade change bevond the oermitted two feet allowed at
prai>ertv line, contrary to the
provisions of the ZoniM Ordinance in a Residential ''R·l"
District.
- C-ase rlo:----,.,.r,t ··over .from
previous meeting, at 651 East
100 South Street in application
Of Odyssey . House by Louise
Lund.eeef'9, a19ent. for a permit
to change a conditional use
from a nursing home to an
Odyssey Adolescent Center,
which has been located at 134
"H" Street, which re<luires
Board of Adlustment approval
in a Residential "R-0" District.
Case No. 7Q.IO. ..:.. reoP8ned ~ .
at 927 South 900 East Street in
application of Wayne A. Kl119
atg
ment building without the reisting group home consisting of
<:1uired off-street parking in a
ei!;lht semi-indes>endent adults
Residential "R-6" District.
which requires Board of AdiustCase Ro~ "793rat 649 bnxen ·
ment aoproval in a Residential
Court in application of Lowell
"R·4" District.
Groberg for a oermit to conA L L P E ~ S 0 N s·· I N •
stnJct a triplex which 'NOUld
TERESTEO IN BEHALF OF
have only partial frontage on a
OR IN OPPOSITION TO ANY
dedicated street and without
OF THE APPLICATIONS
the required rear vard and !tie
WILL BE GIVEN AN OPPORoarking for which WOUid be in
TUNITV TO BE HEARD AT
the required front vard and
THE MEETING THERE.
would not maintain the reDated at Salt Lake Cit-1.
quired design standards in a
Utah, this 17th-day of Februarv.
Residential "R·SA" District.
1979.
MILDRE£>G. SNIDER·
C8-86)
Secretarv
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